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Privacy policy

Up Next is a macOS desktop app that runs entirely on your own Mac. It has no servers, no accounts and no analytics. This policy describes exactly what it accesses and where that data goes.

Last updated: 5 October 2026

What the app accesses

With your permission, Up Next requests two read-only Google Calendar scopes:

These are read-only. The app cannot create, change or delete calendar entries, and it has no access to Gmail, Drive, Contacts or any other Google service.

How that data is used

Event titles, times and meeting links are used only to draw today’s agenda on your screen, show a countdown in your menu bar, and open a meeting link when you click Join.

Event descriptions and attendee lists are read in memory only, to find a meeting link and to check whether you declined an invitation. They are then discarded. They are never stored, never written to logs, and never displayed.

Where data is stored

How this data is protected

Up Next has no servers and no database, so there is no central store of anyone’s calendar data to protect. What protection means here is keeping the data safe in transit between Google and your Mac, and keeping the Google sign-in token safe on the machine itself. The specific mechanisms are below.

Encryption in transit

Every request the app makes travels over HTTPS with TLS, and the certificate is validated by macOS against the system trust store. The app connects to Google’s own API and sign-in endpoints and to nothing else, so there is no other destination for data to reach. Plain HTTP is never used.

Encryption at rest

Your Google access and refresh tokens are encrypted before they are written to disk, using an encryption key held in the macOS Keychain. The Keychain releases that key only to this application, identified by its Apple code signature, and only while you are logged in to your macOS user account. An attacker who copies the token file off the machine cannot read it, because the key does not travel with it.

The encrypted token file, your settings and your TODO list are written inside the application’s own support directory, with file-system permissions that restrict them to your macOS user account. Other users of the same Mac cannot read them.

Minimising what is held at all

Calendar events are never written to disk. They are held in memory for as long as the app is running and are discarded when it closes. Event descriptions and attendee lists are examined in memory to find a meeting link and to detect a declined invitation, then discarded immediately; they are never stored, logged or displayed.

The app requests two read-only scopes and no others, which is the minimum needed to draw your agenda. It cannot create, modify or delete anything in your calendar, so a compromise of the app could not be used to alter your data.

Logs record counts, timings and error codes only. Credentials, event titles, attendees and meeting links are redacted before anything is written, so they cannot leak through a log file or a crash report. Crash reporting is disabled outright.

Protecting the application itself

A stolen credential is only useful if something can be made to misuse it, so the app is hardened against being tampered with or used as a host for other code:

There is no automatic update mechanism and no update server, so there is no channel through which code could be pushed to your machine.

Retention and deletion

The sign-in token is kept only until you disconnect the account or uninstall the app. Calendar data is not retained at all. Completed TODO items are deleted after 30 days, and deleting an item removes it immediately. Because nothing is held on a server, there is nothing to request deletion of — removing the app removes the data.

Reporting a problem

If you believe you have found a vulnerability, please report it privately to edwardmartin.inbox+calendar@gmail.com before disclosing it publicly. The source code is public and can be reviewed by anyone.

No use for AI or machine-learning training

Google user data obtained through Up Next is not used to develop, improve or train generalised or non-personalised artificial-intelligence or machine-learning models, and is not transferred to any third party for that purpose. The app contains no machine-learning components, and no calendar data ever leaves your Mac.

What is never sent anywhere

The app makes network requests only to Google’s own endpoints, to sign in and to read your calendar. It sends no data to the developer or to any third party. There is no analytics, no telemetry and no crash reporting. There is no backend service of any kind, because the app has no server component.

Sharing

Your Google user data is never sold, never shared, and never transferred to anyone. It is not used to train any model, and it is not used for advertising.

Up Next’s use of information received from Google APIs adheres to the Google API Services User Data Policy, including the Limited Use requirements.

Removing your data

Choosing Disconnect in the app revokes the token with Google and deletes it from your Mac. You can also revoke access at any time at myaccount.google.com/permissions. Uninstalling the app removes its stored settings, TODO list and token.

One thing an uninstall leaves behind: the Keychain entry holding the encryption key, which macOS does not let an uninstaller delete. It is harmless on its own, because the encrypted file it unlocks has gone with everything else, but you can remove it yourself by running security delete-generic-password -s "Up Next Safe Storage" in Terminal, or by deleting Up Next Safe Storage in Keychain Access.

Children

The app is not directed at children under 13.

Changes

If this policy changes, the updated version will be published on this page with a new date.

Contact

Questions about this policy, requests about your data, and vulnerability reports can all be sent to edwardmartin.inbox+calendar@gmail.com, which is also the support address on the Google consent screen. For how the app is built and how the credential is protected, see the security overview.