Privacy policy
Up Next is a macOS desktop app that runs entirely on your own Mac. It has no servers, no accounts and no analytics. This policy describes exactly what it accesses and where that data goes.
Last updated: 5 October 2026
What the app accesses
With your permission, Up Next requests two read-only Google Calendar scopes:
-
calendar.events.readonly— to read the events in today’s agenda. -
calendar.calendarlist.readonly— to list your calendars, so you can choose which ones appear.
These are read-only. The app cannot create, change or delete calendar entries, and it has no access to Gmail, Drive, Contacts or any other Google service.
How that data is used
Event titles, times and meeting links are used only to draw today’s agenda on your screen, show a countdown in your menu bar, and open a meeting link when you click Join.
Event descriptions and attendee lists are read in memory only, to find a meeting link and to check whether you declined an invitation. They are then discarded. They are never stored, never written to logs, and never displayed.
Where data is stored
- Calendar events are held in memory while the app is running and are not written to disk. Closing the app discards them.
- Your Google sign-in token is encrypted using the macOS Keychain and stored in the app’s own folder on your Mac, readable only by your user account. It never leaves your machine.
- Your settings — which calendars to show, which monitor to use, and similar preferences — are stored on your Mac. They contain no calendar content.
- Your TODO list is text you type into the app yourself. It is saved unencrypted in the app’s own folder on your Mac, in a file readable only by your user account, so that it survives restarts. It is never sent anywhere, and it is not calendar data: Google neither sees it nor supplies it. Completed items are deleted after 30 days, and deleting an item removes it immediately.
- Logs stay on your Mac. They record counts, timings and error codes. They never contain event titles, attendees, meeting links or credentials.
How this data is protected
Up Next has no servers and no database, so there is no central store of anyone’s calendar data to protect. What protection means here is keeping the data safe in transit between Google and your Mac, and keeping the Google sign-in token safe on the machine itself. The specific mechanisms are below.
Encryption in transit
Every request the app makes travels over HTTPS with TLS, and the certificate is validated by macOS against the system trust store. The app connects to Google’s own API and sign-in endpoints and to nothing else, so there is no other destination for data to reach. Plain HTTP is never used.
Encryption at rest
Your Google access and refresh tokens are encrypted before they are written to disk, using an encryption key held in the macOS Keychain. The Keychain releases that key only to this application, identified by its Apple code signature, and only while you are logged in to your macOS user account. An attacker who copies the token file off the machine cannot read it, because the key does not travel with it.
The encrypted token file, your settings and your TODO list are written inside the application’s own support directory, with file-system permissions that restrict them to your macOS user account. Other users of the same Mac cannot read them.
Minimising what is held at all
Calendar events are never written to disk. They are held in memory for as long as the app is running and are discarded when it closes. Event descriptions and attendee lists are examined in memory to find a meeting link and to detect a declined invitation, then discarded immediately; they are never stored, logged or displayed.
The app requests two read-only scopes and no others, which is the minimum needed to draw your agenda. It cannot create, modify or delete anything in your calendar, so a compromise of the app could not be used to alter your data.
Logs record counts, timings and error codes only. Credentials, event titles, attendees and meeting links are redacted before anything is written, so they cannot leak through a log file or a crash report. Crash reporting is disabled outright.
Protecting the application itself
A stolen credential is only useful if something can be made to misuse it, so the app is hardened against being tampered with or used as a host for other code:
- Builds are signed with an Apple Developer ID certificate and notarised by Apple, so macOS verifies on every launch that the code has not been altered since it was built.
-
The macOS hardened runtime is enabled, with library validation enforced, so the app will
load only code signed by the same developer. The usual code-injection routes, including
DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIESand attaching a debugger, are blocked. - The parts of the app that draw the interface run sandboxed, with no access to the network, no access to the file system and no ability to run privileged code. They never receive a credential, and they never receive a URL.
- Only the privileged part of the app holds the token or talks to Google. Messages between the two halves travel over a small, fixed set of channels, each with a schema that the payload must satisfy and a check on where the message came from.
- Dependencies are pinned to exact versions, package install scripts are disabled, and every change runs registry-signature and vulnerability checks before it can be released.
There is no automatic update mechanism and no update server, so there is no channel through which code could be pushed to your machine.
Retention and deletion
The sign-in token is kept only until you disconnect the account or uninstall the app. Calendar data is not retained at all. Completed TODO items are deleted after 30 days, and deleting an item removes it immediately. Because nothing is held on a server, there is nothing to request deletion of — removing the app removes the data.
Reporting a problem
If you believe you have found a vulnerability, please report it privately to edwardmartin.inbox+calendar@gmail.com before disclosing it publicly. The source code is public and can be reviewed by anyone.
No use for AI or machine-learning training
Google user data obtained through Up Next is not used to develop, improve or train generalised or non-personalised artificial-intelligence or machine-learning models, and is not transferred to any third party for that purpose. The app contains no machine-learning components, and no calendar data ever leaves your Mac.
What is never sent anywhere
The app makes network requests only to Google’s own endpoints, to sign in and to read your calendar. It sends no data to the developer or to any third party. There is no analytics, no telemetry and no crash reporting. There is no backend service of any kind, because the app has no server component.
Sharing
Your Google user data is never sold, never shared, and never transferred to anyone. It is not used to train any model, and it is not used for advertising.
Up Next’s use of information received from Google APIs adheres to the Google API Services User Data Policy, including the Limited Use requirements.
Removing your data
Choosing Disconnect in the app revokes the token with Google and deletes it from your Mac. You can also revoke access at any time at myaccount.google.com/permissions. Uninstalling the app removes its stored settings, TODO list and token.
One thing an uninstall leaves behind: the Keychain entry holding the encryption key, which
macOS does not let an uninstaller delete. It is harmless on its own, because the encrypted
file it unlocks has gone with everything else, but you can remove it yourself by running
security delete-generic-password -s "Up Next Safe Storage" in
Terminal, or by deleting Up Next Safe Storage in Keychain Access.
Children
The app is not directed at children under 13.
Changes
If this policy changes, the updated version will be published on this page with a new date.
Contact
Questions about this policy, requests about your data, and vulnerability reports can all be sent to edwardmartin.inbox+calendar@gmail.com, which is also the support address on the Google consent screen. For how the app is built and how the credential is protected, see the security overview.